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Abstract
Using bilateral trade flow data from 1979 to 1999, we estimate trade integra-
tion between Chile and its principal trading partners during the period (European
Union, United States and Latin America). Our estimates are based on a gravity
specification, theoretically grounded on a monopolistic competition framework with
increasing returns. Trade barriers are measured following the border effect method-
ology by comparing inter-national imports to intra-national ones. Our results are
consistent with the agenda of trade integration followed by Chile. Moreover, trade
integration turns out to be heterogeneous across industries and over the time. We
also find asymmetries between export and import oriented policies. All these fea-
tures are usually missing when one uses direct measures of trade policies.
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1 Introduction
Despite common views of world globalization, the assessments about the level of trade
integration of an ”open” country reveal contrasted results (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004). The reason is that trade costs involve not only direct policies such as tariffs, non-
tariff barriers and exchange rates, but also more indirect integration policies like insurance,
infrastructure, informational networks, enforcement laws and property rights. The picture
becomes still more complex if language, preferences and tastes are taken into account to
encompass a potential home bias in consumption. In this context, the standard use of
tariff data or aggregate trade ratios turns out to under exploit well known international
examples of trade integration.
The Chilean experience is one of these examples. Chilean dictatorship in power from
1973 to 1990, implemented a deep package of market reforms concerning every economic
field. Among them, trade liberalization took place in the second half of seventies. Since
the beginning of the military government, all trade barriers and restrictions to trade were
removed. Average nominal tariff decreased gradually from 98% in 1973 to 10% in 1979
(Figure 1). Specially during ’90s, Chilean government further achieved its commitment to
promote trade by pursuing several trade agreements with different countries and regions
(Table 1) including almost all Latin American countries, the United States (US), the
European Union (EU) and also Asian countries in recent years. However, if one looks
at nominal tariffs, after the middle of ’80 the picture depicts a flat evolution, which
in addition is almost homogeneous across industries. This picture documents the quite
radical unilateral trade liberalization in late ’70s , but it hides important policy efforts
to boost exports and the international political integration obtained after the transition
to democracy. On the other hand, aggregated trade flows will not be a plausible measure
because of its lack of detail and the bias induced by ”exogenous” shocks on productivity
and demand sides.
This paper aims at getting deeper insights of the Chile’s integration strategy by dis-
entangling two elemental dimension of trade: export and import oriented policies. By
the means of bilateral industry-level trade data of Chile and its main trading partners in
manufacturing (European Union, the Unite States and Latin America), we measure the
evolution of market access across industries in both direction of trade. Since the strategy
of Chilean government was to set a combination of trade policies, we should be able to
capture the effect of the full set of barriers faced by Chilean exporters to access foreign
markets and also the one faced by Chilean partners to reach the domestic market. This
also means the identification of potential asymmetries in policy protection and their evo-
lution. The methodology steaming from the empirical literature of border effect fits these
requirements.
This methodology makes use of gravity equations and provides a measure of interna-
tional trade integration by considering, as a very intuitive benchmark, the market access of
domestic producers reaching domestic (intra-border) destinations. Consider for instance
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Figure 1: Nominal Tariffs
Evolution of Nominal Tariffs in Chile: 1975-2000
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Nominal Tariffs Source: Central Bank of Chile
two countries. If, after crossing the national border, producers face no additional barriers
to trade than those already present in the national market, both countries will be consider
as completely integrated. The pioneer work of McCallum (1995) use this strategy along
with detailed intra-national trade data to study the market access between Canada and
the US. Despite of their high expected trade integration, trade between US and Canada
is found to be around 22 times more difficult than Canadian intra-national trade.
Such assessment, of course, should be done keeping everything else equals. Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003) have demonstrated that the lack of theoretical foundation
might lead to a bias on the estimated border effects. Namely, omitted variables concern-
ing multilateral price indexes would have induced an upward bias in McCallum (1995)
estimates, though the ”corrected” border effect still remains important in regard of direct
trade cost measures between both countries. In order to identify a set of determinants
of trade that we should control for, we follow Fontagne´, Mayer and Zignago (2005) and
Head and Mayer (2001) specification based on a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
framework with increasing retuns as in Krugman (1980). Their theoretically grounded
gravity equation relies on Wei (1996) strategy to solve the problem of the lack of informa-
tion on internal national flows by simply considering production minus exports. By using
this specification we stay as close as possible to theory and keep a nice feature of border
effect literature: the measure of eventual asymmetries in protection. Since in this paper
we focus on disentangling export and import barriers, the rigorous exercise of general
equilibrium comparative statics of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is less convenient
for our purpose as it assumes symmetry in trade costs across countries.
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Previous studies concerning Chilean integration have mainly focused on macro-economic
and welfare effects of trade agreements using general equilibrium models (Harrison, Ruther-
ford and Tarr (2003); Chumacero, Fuentes and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004); Cabezas (2003)).
Among the exceptions using a gravity approach, Nowak-Lehman, Herzer and Vollmer
(2007) analyze the impact of trade agreements between Chile and the EU on the structure
of exports and predict important export expansion on foods industries (mainly fish, fruits
and beverages). Our contribution to this literature consists of providing an assessment of
the evolution of trade integration at the industry level considering all barriers to trade.
By doing so, we obtain measures of Chilean trade integration presenting heterogeneity
across sectors and over the time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the estimation strategy is
presented. Section 3 presents the database used in the estimations. Section 4 discusses the
main results of border effects estimations at national and also at industry level. Section
5 concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
2.1 Estimation strategy
Several empirical applications of gravity equations have been proposed in the literature.
We are particularly interested in those comparing intranational trade flows (within a
country) to international trade flow (between countries). We follow the methodology of
Fontagne´, Mayer and Zignago (2005) based on Head and Mayer (2001) gravity model
derivation. This methodology seems suitable to measure Chilean trade integration as
it corrects for the lack of theoretical foundations of earlier works, keeping the intuitive
strategy of using intra-national trade as a benchmark of trade integration. Let us consider
a CES utility function in which the (representative) consumer of country i has specific
preferences for each variety h depending on the country of origin j (the exporter).
Ui =
 N∑
j=1
Mj∑
h=1
(aijcijh)
σ−1
σ
 σσ−1
Where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among domestic and foreign
differentiated varieties. This standard CES formulation, implies an expenditure in imports
from country j with the form:
mij = cijpij =
(
pij
aijP
)1−σ
MjYi (1)
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Since varieties belonging to the same country share the same weight in the utility func-
tion we just drop the h subscript and consider the whole set of K =
N∑
j=1
Mj international
varieties. Imports are valuated at the point of consumption (in c.i.f) pij = pjτij and in-
clude the producer price (in f.o.b.) pj augmented of all transaction costs related to trade,
modeled as iceberg costs τij. Total expenditure of country i equals its income Yi =
K∑
k=1
mik
and considers all imports, including intra-national ones. This gravity-like equation in (1)
summarizes in P =
[
K∑
k=1
(
pik
aik
)1−σ
Mk
] 1
1−σ
the consumer prices of all varieties.
This index allows us to introduce Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) critics about the
absence of theoretical foundations and the assumption of identical prices across countries.
P is a multilateral variable that takes into account asymmetries across countries in price
setting, namely size, as well as trade barriers and preferences. If omitted, not only a
multilateral control is missing but also a bias is generated between the error term and
the border effect dummies. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that the omission of
multilateral price effects (what they call ”multilateral resistances”) explains the upward
bias in border effects of Canada vis-a`-vis the US estimated by McCallum(1995).
One might mention four possible strategies to consistently estimate this equation cap-
turing price effects in a theoretical index. The first strategy is to use price index data.
Bergstrand (1989) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) follow this strategy measuring prices
with GDP deflators. However, as highlighted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), em-
pirical counterparts of P such as CPIs measures neglect changes in the true set of varieties
and do not accurately reflect non tariff barriers and indirect trade policies.
The second strategy is the one followed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). They
develop a method using estimated border effects to measure price effects. This estimation
strategy is based on two steps. The first one consists in the estimation of the gravity
equation using a non-linear least squares estimator to obtain the parameters. In the
second step, they remove border barriers and calculate the change in bilateral trade flows
to determine the impact of national borders on trade flows. Besides practical difficulties
of implementation1, one crucial limitation for our purposes, as we previously explained,
is the assumption of symmetry in bilateral trade costs.
The third approach is to use fixed effects specification to measure unobservable prices.
Price indexes are considered as unobservable variables and they are measured as the
coefficients of individual fixed effects related to source and destination (Harrigan, 1996;
Hummels 1999). Feenstra (2003) shows that the coefficients of fixed effects estimation
1One should implement a routine in which at each iteration the sum of square residuals of the gravity
equation are minimized, solving simultaneously the estimation of trade cost at each stage and computing
the multilateral prices index
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are consistent and present values very similar to the non-linear least squares estimation.
Nevertheless, this method requires data of trade flows between all provinces of Chile and
the full list of countries, information which is now unavailable.
An additional strategy is to eliminate the price index in equation (1) by expressing
inter-national imports mij, relative to intra-national ones mii. This is what Head and
Mayer (2001) do. Under monopolistic competition and symmetric technology, quantities
are symmetric at the equilibrium and the number of firms of each country is obtained
by simply dividing output value vj by firm output value: Mj =
vj
qpj
.Considering pij =
pjτij,equation (1) can be written as:
mij
mii
=
(
aij
aii
)σ−1(
pj
pi
)−σ (
τij
τii
)1−σ (
vj
vi
)
(2)
To obtain and empirical counterpart of this gravity equation, Fontagne´, Mayer and
Zignago (2005) state, as usually, that trade costs (τij) are composed by distance (dij)
(related to transport costs), advalorem tariffs (tij) and ”tariff equivalent” of non tariff
barriers (NTBij).
τijpj ≡ dδij (1 + tij) (1 +NTBij) pj.
The structure of protection varies across all partner pairs and depends on the direction
of the flow for a given pair. To capture this protection framework, taking the example of
the US as trade partner, the following dummy structure is defined:
(1 + tij) (1 +NTBij) ≡ exp [ηUS CHLij + γCHL USij]
Where US CHLij is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when j is Chile and i is the US
(related to imports of the US from Chile). Similarly, CHL USij is a dummy variable set
equal to 1 when j is the US and i is Chile (imports of Chile from the US).
Preferences aij are composed by a random component eij and a coefficient βi, rep-
resenting a systematic preference for goods produced in the home country. This ”home
market bias” is reduced to (βi − λ) when the countries share the same language (Lij = 1):
aij ≡ exp [eij − (βi − λLij) (US CHLij + CHL USij)]
Combining the previous equations and adding the subscript s for variables that will
be used at the industry level, the following estimable equation is obtained:
ln
(
mijs
miis
)
= ln
(
vjs
vis
)
− (σ − 1) δ ln
(
dij
dii
)
+ (σ − 1)λLij − σ ln
(
pj
pi
)
(3)
− (σ − 1) [βi + η]US CHLij − (σ − 1) [βi + γ]CHL USij
+ij
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Where ij = (σ − 1) (eij − eii). Hence, the ratio of bilateral trade flows over intrana-
tional trade flows in the industry s
(
mijs
miis
)
is explained by a list of observable variables:
the relative value added of partners in the industry
(
vjs
vis
)
, their relative distance
(
dij
dii
)
,
the relative prices at national level
(
pj
pi
)
and a dummy to indicate if the pair (i, j) share
the same language (Lij). The part of missing trade not explained by these determinants is
attributed to the fact that the exchanges take place between two particular and different
nations. In that sense, the border effects coefficients reveal all market access difficulties
for each specific trade flow. Other than ”standard” trade policies, these difficulties might
reflect consumers’ preferences for domestic goods relative to foreign ones (“home market
bias”). As long as the latter might be interpreted, at least in part, as the outcome of
history and political efforts, we consider them as a part of the measure of trade integration.
In the regressions, we drop the constant and incorporate both dummy variables, each
for one direction of trade flows. Thus, their coefficients can be directly interpreted as
the border effect of each combination. For example, the exponential of the coefficient
of US CHLij multiplied by -1, exp ((σ − 1) [βi + η]) indicates the difficulty for Chilean
exporters in accessing US markets.
As Fontagne´, Mayer and Zignago (2005) we use aggregate prices to address the possible
endogeneity problem that might arise in the estimation of equation (3). This endogeneity
issue is associated to the simultaneity in the determination of prices and output in a mo-
nopolistic competition framework. Prices at national level should be less likely correlated
with profit maximization at the industry level. We also consider relative wages at the
industry level. This alternative measure of relative prices is used to control for potential
asymmetries in technology. More productive industries are expected to have lower border
effects. We also run regressions using lagged values of relative value added and relative
prices to reduce the risk of correlation between both sides of equation(3) in the nominal
valuation of flows.
In the estimation of equation (3) we should consider a representative set of countries
trading with Chile. Looking at the aggregated trade flow data of the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) between 1990 and 1999, the main
destination of Chilean manufacturing exports are Latin America (AL), the United States
(USA) and the European Union (UE) (Figure 2 ). The graph also shows that, during the
same period, most manufacturing imports of Chile came from these countries.
2.2 Data
Use is made of the Trade and Production Database constructed by CEPII. The main
source is the Trade and Production Database constructed by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001)
at the World Bank. Since this database presents many missing values for production
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Figure 2: Chilean manufacturing trading partners
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variables in recent years, the CEPII has extended it using production variables of UNIDO
and OECD STAN for OECD members. They have also completed trade data with their
international trade database BACI. The final dataset provides information on value added,
export and import trade flows, origin and destination countries, wages and labour at
the 3-digit industry level (ISIC Rev-2) over the period 1976-1999 for 67 developing and
developed countries. Price indexes steam from Penn World Table as price level of GDP
expressed relative to United States.
Detailed intranational trade flows for our sample of countries is not available. Follow-
ing Wei(1996), intra-national trade is computed as output minus exports. This requires an
appropriate measure of internal distance that should take into account economic activity
to weight internal regions. For distance variables, contiguity and common language, we
use the CEPII database of internal and external distances. The CEPII use specific city
level data in order to compute a matrix of distance including the geographic population
density for each country. Similarly, distance between two countries are measured based on
bilateral distance between cities weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s
population.
At the end the data is available for nine members of the European Union throughout
the whole period 1979-1999 (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Ireland, Netherlands and Denmark) and for six Latin American partners (Bolivia,
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Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela)
3 Estimation results
Equation 3 is estimated at the country level (all manufacturing) and also splitting the
sample by industries. Firstly, we analyze the aggregated evolution of Chilean trade in-
tegration. We run pooled regressions and estimate border effects over all industries and
years and also within different periods. Secondly, we go to the detail of the 2 digit in-
dustry level to explain differences in the degree of trade openness across sectors. From
this estimation we obtain the global border effect measure for each industry as a weighted
average of all trading partners.
3.1 Border effects at the national level
Table 1 presents the results across all industries and years. All regressions are run using
OLS and Hubert and White standard errors to control for the correlation in the error
term in (3). Column [1] reports regressions using current values of independent variables
and aggregated prices. As predicted by the theory, the coefficient on relative value added
is significant, positive and relatively closed to one. The coefficient on relative prices is
significant and negative. However as usually in this kind of exercise, its value is smaller
than the expected elasticity of substitution. The effect of contiguity is also significant
and positive indicating that having a common border facilitates trade. Surprisingly, the
coefficient of the dummy variable indicating whether the partners share a common lan-
guage is negative. This can be explained by the countries present in the sample. Relative
to Latin American countries, those sharing the Spanish language, the EU and the US
represent important international flows that might offset the effect of language.
In column [2] we use relative wages at the industry level instead of relative price at
national level. In the monopolistic competition framework relative prices equals relative
wages. More importantly wages take into account labour productivity differentials among
partners. Their effect turns out to be similar to relative prices but with a lower coefficient
that might reflect labour market asymmetries. Column [3] in Table 1 introduces the lag
of relative value added and relative prices to address potential correlation between both
sides of the equation steaming from the valuation of nominal trade flows and output.
Results remain almost unchanged. A Similar conclusion can be obtained from column [4],
which considers lagged relative wages.
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Table 1: Border Effects at the country level (all manufacturing
industries)
[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ]
Rel. VA 0.822*** 0.829***
(0.007) (0.007)
Rel Price -1.012***
(0.066)
Rel Wage -0.742***
(0.013)
Rel.VA (t-1) 0.815*** 0.819***
(0.008) (0.007)
Rel Price (t-1) -1.122***
(0.068)
Rel Wage (t-1) -0.743***
(0.012)
Rel Distance -0.827*** -0.776*** -0.819*** -0.754***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
contiguity 0.876*** 0.990*** 0.890*** 1.035***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Language -0.350*** -0.360*** -0.355*** -0.355***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030)
UE CHL -5.386*** -5.783*** -5.190*** -5.582***
(0.138) (0.131) (0.146) (0.138)
CHL UE -4.239*** -4.269*** -4.079*** -4.224***
(0.124) (0.112) (0.128) (0.115)
USA CHL -4.061*** -4.399*** -4.071*** -4.381***
(0.114) (0.105) (0.116) (0.106)
CHL USA -3.897*** -3.822*** -3.828*** -3.860***
(0.113) (0.105) (0.118) (0.110)
UE UE -2.723*** -2.836*** -2.744*** -2.893***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057)
AL CHL -5.120*** -4.946*** -4.944*** -4.828***
(0.092) (0.093) (0.096) (0.097)
CHL AL -4.765*** -5.200*** -4.622*** -5.099***
(0.103) (0.099) (0.107) (0.102)
AL AL -5.347*** -5.663*** -5.276*** -5.674***
(0.079) (0.077) (0.083) (0.081)
UE AL -5.020*** -5.609*** -5.141*** -5.726***
(0.120) (0.110) (0.126) (0.115)
AL UE -4.774*** -4.913*** -4.679*** -4.945***
(0.098) (0.088) (0.103) (0.092)
AL USA -4.508*** -4.403*** -4.359*** -4.406***
(0.091) (0.081) (0.095) (0.084)
USA AL -3.752*** -4.738*** -3.856*** -4.811***
(0.095) (0.085) (0.099) (0.087)
UE USA -2.878*** -2.744*** -2.873*** -2.775***
(0.092) (0.093) (0.096) (0.097)
USA UE -2.685*** -2.883*** -2.703*** -2.938***
(0.070) (0.068) (0.072) (0.071)
Number of Obs 53278 63073 47843 57861
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.912 0.911 0.912 0.911
Note: Huber White Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
The coefficients of border effects estimates indicate that, on average, during the period
1979-1999 Chilean exporters faced higher barriers to enter the European Union than the
barriers faced by European’s exporters to sell in Chilean markets (5.386 versus 4.30). A
similar asymmetry is founded in flows regarding the US (4.061 against 3.897). These first
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results indicate that, on average, Chilean exporters experienced more difficulties to access
foreign markets in the period than their partners. The larger border effect found in the
case of Latin American countries illustrate that distance, language and contiguity are not
the only source of barriers. Although higher, these estimates are in line with those found
by Fontagne´, Mayer and Zignago (2005) for the US and the EU. Inside the EU trade is
reduced by a factor of 14.87 (exp(2.73), column [1]) when crossing the border of European
nations.
Table 2: The evolution of Border Effects at the country level
[79-82] [83-86] [87-90] [91-94] [95-99]
Rel. VA 0.793*** 0.835*** 0.822*** 0.834*** 0.832***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Rel Wage -0.905*** -0.855*** -0.471*** -0.435*** -0.301***
(0.073) (0.017) (0.071) (0.059) (0.044)
Rel. Distance -0.651*** -0.691*** -0.701*** -0.868*** -0.921***
(0.070) (0.054) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048)
Contiguity 1.014*** 0.995*** 1.068*** 0.983*** 0.779***
(0.084) (0.081) (0.078) (0.074) (0.070)
Language 0.028 -0.061 -0.144** -0.234*** -0.315***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.051)
UE CHL -6.617*** -6.663*** -5.871*** -4.497*** -4.507***
(0.366) (0.297) (0.281) (0.280) (0.264)
CHL UE -4.844*** -5.021*** -5.048*** -4.113*** -3.754***
(0.323) (0.246) (0.254) (0.251) (0.208)
USA CHL -6.491*** -5.604*** -4.009*** -3.248*** -2.787***
(0.379) (0.237) (0.203) (0.209) (0.180)
CHL USA -4.185*** -4.433*** -4.815*** -3.627*** -3.372***
(0.296) (0.220) (0.259) (0.233) (0.187)
UE UE -3.273*** -3.057*** -2.996*** -2.483*** -2.378***
(0.140) (0.116) (0.111) (0.117) (0.114)
AL CHL -6.096*** -6.599*** -6.141*** -4.583*** -3.879***
(0.359) (0.239) (0.192) (0.176) (0.152)
CHL AL -6.391*** -6.517*** -5.904*** -4.913*** -3.862***
(0.278) (0.214) (0.204) (0.210) (0.172)
AL AL -7.035*** -6.813*** -6.338*** -5.486*** -4.876***
(0.280) (0.169) (0.159) (0.158) (0.139)
UE AL -6.561*** -6.515*** -5.569*** -4.637*** -3.982***
(0.310) (0.242) (0.241) (0.242) (0.229)
AL UE -5.529*** -5.649*** -5.800*** -4.764*** -4.545***
(0.279) (0.189) (0.213) (0.194) (0.169)
AL USA -4.635*** -5.212*** -5.441*** -4.120*** -4.115***
(0.250) (0.177) (0.202) (0.178) (0.158)
USA AL -6.292*** -5.440*** -4.354*** -3.827*** -3.076***
(0.218) (0.182) (0.195) (0.185) (0.184)
UE USA -3.207*** -3.175*** -3.189*** -2.339*** -2.253***
(0.260) (0.201) (0.188) (0.201) (0.186)
USA UE -3.886*** -3.307*** -3.002*** -2.550*** -2.123***
(0.170) (0.147) (0.140) (0.145) (0.136)
Number of Obs 9110 12769 13950 11642 15602
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.915 0.915 0.916 0.915 0.912
Note: Huber White Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
One possible explanation of these high average estimates relates with the high protec-
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Figure 3: Trade barriers reduction (%), last period versus first
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tion of Chilean economy in early ’70. To analyze this, Table 2 splits the full sample in five
periods. This time, regressions consider wage differentials, the specification in column [2]
of Table 1. Clearly trade integration in recent years is higher than their initial level and
the average of the period. On the other hand, our first results are confirmed: even though
trade has become easier over time, Chile appears as more open to imports from Europe
(CHL UE) than Europe to Chilean exporters (UE CHL).
A similar asymmetry is found for trade flows with the US until the first half of ’80.
However, in the last two periods (1987-1999) the US has become more open to Chile than
Chile vis-a-vis the US. Regarding Latin American countries trade barriers have evolved
almost symmetrically, though the border effects still remain important. In the last period,
trade between Chile and a Latin American country of the sample was reduced in average by
a factor of 49% (=exp(3.9)) in comparison with intra national trade. Figure 3 summarizes
the reduction of border effect during time by comparing the last period to the first one.
The most important change in trade integration is found in the US market access for
Chilean exporters (USA< −−CHL). Trade barriers faced by Chilean producers when
reaching American markets have been reduced by around 57%. In addition, considering
differences instead of levels highlights asymmetries: Chilean border effects vis-a`-vis the
US have been reduced only by 19%.
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3.2 Border Effects at Industry level
Finally, we estimate border effect at the two digit industry level to observe differences
across industry patterns. To take into account the evolution over the full time period we
run the regressions using a rolling window of four years. For instance, the border effect
of the year 1982 is the estimate of the regression between 1979 and 1982. Figure 4 shows
these estimates. All of them are significant, at least at 5%. The dashed line depicts import
border effects and the solid one those corresponding to exports. The figure summarizes
the weighted average of border effect across partners using their share over total export
or imports.
Difficulties of Chilean exporters accessing foreign markets were relatively constant
at the beginning of eighties. Reflecting the beginning of the active trade agreements
agenda and political integration, most industries switch to a downward trend which is
specially pronounced during nineties. This is namely the case of wood, textile, plastic
and machinery. Two important exporting industries, basic metals and food, experiment an
evolution of export border effects almost flat. The former, however, is the most traditional
exporting industry and its trade barriers are already low at the beginning of the period.
On the other hand, the rather flat evolution of food exports relative to its consumption
within the national border might reflect namely quality controls imposed by EU and the
US. Home biases are also likely associated with this type of industry. Once again one
observes the extent to which direct measures of trade such as tariffs do not reflect the
whole picture of trade policies : export difficulties have considerably diminished in all
industries during nineties even if tariffs were already very low.
Figure 4 also shows the evolution of the weighted measure of industry level barriers
faced by UE, LA and USA to access Chilean markets (dashed line). In this case, in
many industries market access difficulties increased during the first half of eighties (food,
textile, wood, non metallic goods and machinery). This seems very consistent with the
rise in import tariffs during this period and other discretionary measures to control the
current account deficit during the crises. As we consider a moving average this tendency
is observed even in late eighties, reflecting a lagged effect of protection.
During nineties, import border effects have been reduced in almost all industries with
the exception of basic metals. Tariffs attain a very low level at the beginning of ’90s
(11%). This is also the decade in which the new strategy of trade integration based on
several bilateral and multilateral trade agreements begins. The reduction and convergence
of import border effect observed for some industries (machinery, non metallic products,
plastic and textiles) seems quite consistent with the agenda of Chilean trade policies.
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Figure 4: Border effects at the industry level
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4 Conclusion
Using bilateral trade flow data of Chile and its principal trading partners for the pe-
riod 1979-1999, we have estimated the barriers to trade arising when a producer locates
in a foreign nation. Our econometric specification, theoretically grounded in a monop-
olistic competition framework with increasing returns to scale, search to explain each
inter-national import flow relative to intra-national one. The estimates of international
trade difficulties are thus relative to those faced by domestic producers reaching domestic
consumers.
Results are consistent with the agenda of trade integration followed by Chile. Namely,
during nineties the reduction of export barriers estimates have been considerably reduced.
This pro-active strategy implies asymmetries between the rapid evolution of export barri-
ers and the tendency depicted by import’s unilateral liberalization, specially regarding the
US. At the industry level a certain convergence is observed for the last periods, reflecting
the effects of free trades agreements. Overall, these results highlight an heterogeneity in
trade barriers measures across industries, among export and import policies and over the
time that is not captured using direct measure of trade policies. This heterogeneity could
help to understand the effects of trade on manufacturing performances as it brings more
variance concerning the outcome of trade policies. Further research should be oriented to
implement this type of exercise.
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